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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-1/16/76 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, 
-and 
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL 
ASSOCIATION, 
SERVICE 
Ct 
Respondent, : 
EMPLOYEES : 
targing Party. [ 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1426 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of the Town of Oyster Bay 
(respondent) from a decision of a hearing officer determining that it had 
violated CSL §209-a.l(d) when, on or about November 15, 1975, it unilaterally 
changed the hours of work of certain employees who were represented by the 
Town of Oyster Bay Unit, Nassau Chapter, CSEA (charging party). The charging 
party had alleged that respondent had violated CSL §209-a.l(a) and (d) in 
that it "unilaterally changed terms and conditions of employment of Sanitation 
Foremen, members of the unit represented by CSEA, by increasing their working 
1 
hours without providing any additional compensation." The hearing officer 
determined that respondent did unilaterally alter the hours of work of 
sanitation foremen who are members of the unit represented by the charging 
party. He concluded that this unilateral change constituted a violation of 
CSL §209-a.l(d), but not of §209-a.l(a). He found that there had been a 
longstanding past practice under which Sanitation Foremen I had been permitted 
to "sign out" on a "completion of task" basis. In this, they were like the 
sanitary collection men whose work they supervised. 
1 The charge also alleged other improper conduct by respondent, but these 
aspects of the charge were resolved by the parties prior to the hearing. 
They were not dealt with in the hearing officer's decision and are not 
before us now. 4 1 3 4 
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The respondent submitted a five-page exception in narrative form. 
Although the exceptions were not enumerated, they can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. There was no past practice upon which the Foremen I could rely. 
To the extent that Foremen I were permitted to go home upon completion 
of their tasks, it was a privilege granted by the employer which did 
not vest. 
2. There was no uniform practice of Foremen I leaving upon the 
completion of their tasks, as indicated by their practice of seeking 
permission to leave. Moreover, the Foremen I had responsibilities 
after the groups whom they supervised had completed their daily 
assignments. 
3. Various provisions of respondent's contract with charging party 
reserved to it prerogatives sufficient to cover the allegedly improper 
2 
conduct. The contract authorized sanitary collection men to work until 
the completion of their regular tasks. The absence of any similar 
contractual reference to Foremen I indicates that Foremen I enjoyed no 
similar right. A reference in the 1975-76 contract to "sanitary 
collection men and their foremen" is an indication that the term 
"sanitary collection men" does not cover foremen. 
Discussion 
Having reviewed the record, we confirm the determination of the hearing 
3 
officer. 
1_ Contract Sections 4-1.0 and 4-1.4 specify a management right to determine 
schedules of work, including overtime, and §9-6.0 limits the agreement to 
matters explicitly agreed to by the parties. 
_3 Obviously this decision does not involve any judgment as to whether 
sanitation foremen ought to be employed for set hours or on an incentive 
basis involving a completion of work schedule subject to maximum hours. 
4^ O h 
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Foremen I have been employed on a "completion of task" basis for at 
least twenty years. In our judgment this is a term and condition of their 
employment. The practice of Foremen I had been to return to the yard when 
all their crews had completed their daily assignments in order to fill out 
their daily report sheets. This involved stating the total mileage and gas 
consumption per day, quitting time and the disposition of homeowner complaints. 
Usually the Foreman I was free to leave after completing these reports. On 
occasion, the Foremen I had to remain for a meeting or had to deal with a 
homeowner complaint. However, they had not been required to wait for com-
plaints. Occasionally such complaints were handled by the Foreman I on his 
way home. If the Foreman I had gone before a complaint was received, it was 
handled by someone else or held for the following day. When his work was com-
pleted, the Foreman I was free to sign out and leave. That the Foremen I 
signed out before leaving did not imply that they were obtaining permission 
on an ad hoc basis to leave before their normal quitting time. Their normal 
quitting time was related to the completion of their daily responsibilities, 
and not to the clock. 
The contract does not justify or authorize respondent's conduct. On 
its face, the reference to "sanitary collection men" in the earlier contract 
might be read to either include or exclude the sanitary collection foremen. 
The hearing officer correctly disregarded the reference to "sanitary collection 
men and their foremen" in the 1975-76 contract because that language was nego-
tiated in the context of the instant dispute when the charging party was aware 
of respondent's contention that Foremen I were not covered by the "sanitary 
collection men." It does not reflect upon the parties' understanding of that 
term at an earlier time. More persuasive of what the parties understood that 
term to mean is the longstanding past practice of treating sanitary collection 
men and Foremen I in the same manner - both were permitted to leave upon the 
Board - U-1426 
-4 
completion of their daily tasks. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we confirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the hearing officer and, in accordance with those 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in view of 
the specific violation of the Act that we have found, 
WE ORDER the Town of Oyster Bay to negotiate in good faith. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
January 16, 1976 
•^"Chairman 
Joseph R. Crowley 
</$ pf^~ 
Fred L. Denson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent, 
"'"" -arid- ' 
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party'. 
#2B-l/l6/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1563 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of the Genesee Community 
College Faculty Association (charging party) to a decision of the hearing 
officer granting a motion of the Genesee Community College (respondent) that 
he dismiss the charge herein. The charge had been filed on April 7, 1975. 
1 
It alleged that respondent had violated CSL §209-a.l(a.)., (b) , (c) and (d). 
There are two aspects of the charge. The first aspect is the allegation that 
on or about December 12, 1974 respondent, bypassing the charging party, 
requested individual negotiations with James Kelly and Judith Sikora regarding 
1_ The charge states: 
"On or about December 12, 1974, Dean Dorsey Brause of Genesee 
Community College approached individually two probationary faculty 
members, James Kelly and Judit[h] Sikora and told them individually 
that he wished to negotiate changes in their job functions. In 
addition, he told each employee individually that if he/she did 
not agree with the requested job function change, the employee(s) 
would not be recommended for tenure. 
"Mr. Kelly did not agree to the changes and was subsequently 
denied tenure by the Board of Trustees. Ms. Sikora did agree to 
changes and was awarded tenure by the Board of Trustees. In neither 
instance was the Genesee Community College Faculty Association (G.F.A 
notified of the necessity of negotiations. The G.F.A. is the 
recognized collective bargaining agent for the faculty and has a 
collective bargaining agreement in effect with the employer-unfil. 
August 31, 1977." 4.100 
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changes in their job functions, such negotiations occurring under the threat 
that Kelly and Sikora would not be recommended for tenure. The second aspect 
of the charge is the allegation that Kelly was denied tenure because he did 
not agree to the proposed changes in his job function. 
After two days of hearing, by which time the charging party had 
completed the presentation of 'i£s.case, except for two witnesses whose 
testimony did not pertain either to Kelly or to events after December 5, 1974, 
respondent moved to dismiss the charge. The basis for its motion was that the 
charge was not timely and that, insofar as the charge related to the denial 
of tenure to Kelly, there was a failure of proof. The hearing officer granted 
the motion and dismissed the charge in its entirety. In concluding that certain 
aspects of the charge were untimely, the hearing officer had to determine that 
the circumstances giving rise to those aspects of the charge occurred before 
2 "' 
December 7, 1974.— The hearing officer found that the operative date for 
negotiations between respondent and Sikora and Kelly was December 3, 1974. The 
charging party excepts to this conclusion, as well as the conclusion that it 
failed to prove that Kelly was denied tenure because of his refusal to negotiate 
on an individual basis and agree to the changes in job functions proposed by 
the respondent. 
Having reviewed the record, we confirm the determinations of the 
hearing officer. Respondent first sought individual negotiations with Sikora 
and Kelly before December 3, 1974 and not on December 12, 1974 as is alleged 
in the charge. As a general matter, it is improper for a public employer to 
2_ Section 204.1(a) of our Rules restricts the filing of a charge to within 
four months of the date of the improper conduct. 
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bypass a recognized or certified employee organization and to seek to negotiate 
directly with employees who are within the negotiating unit. An employee 
organization may, however, consent to such a practice. The action of respondent 
prior to December 3, 1974 in seeking to negotiate directly with Sikora and Kelly 
may have been inappropriate but, to the extent that it might relate to that 
period, the charge is not timely. On December 3, 1974 the charging party 
consented to the negotations between respondent and Sikora and Kelly. This 
consent constituted a waiver of the right of the charging party to object to 
its being bypassed in negotiations thereafter, which would include the entire 
period that is not time barred. 
The dismissal of so much of the charge as involves direct negotiations 
with Sikora and Kelly on the basis of timeliness still leaves open the possi-
bility that Kelly was denied tenure as a reprisal for refusing to agree to 
respondent's proposals during negotiations. It is not clear whether the 
operative facts in the denial of tenure to Kelly occurred on December 6, 1974 
or December 9, 1974. Thus, this aspect of the charge might be timely. However, 
the correctness of the hearing officer's decision to dismiss this aspect of the 
charge for failure of proof makes it unnecessary to reach the question. The 
evidence establishes that Kelly was not threatened that he would be denied 
tenure by reason of a refusal to negotiate on an individual basis or agree to 
changes in the functions of his job as proposed by respondent. 
Respondent decided to lay off employees for economic reasons. This 
was not an improper practice (Matter of the City School District of the City 
of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 3704, 3706 [1971]). Neither was respondent's offer to 
negotiate over its proposal that was designed to avoid the layoffs. That these 
negotiations were unsuccessful and a layoff resulted also does not constitute 
any violation of the Taylor Law. Kelly was :aware. that unless the job functions 
of some members of the physical education staff were restructured, somegtfembers 
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of that staff might be laid off for economic reasons. As the member of that 
staff with the lowest seniority, he knew that he would be the first to go. 
To the extent that the charge complains about this circumstance, it does not 
allege a violation. To the extent that it alleges an improper threat against 
Kelly, it is not supported by the evidence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the charge herein should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
January 16, 1976 
Robert D. Helsbyy'fihairman 
Fred L. Denson 
d.4 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
RENSSELAER, 
Employer, • 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE """ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' -Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Civil Service. Employees 
Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit:, Included: -All non-instructional employees. 
Excluded: Business manager, secretary to the superinten-
dent of schools, maintenance foreman, supervisor of buildings and 
grounds, and food service manager. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees . 
Association, Inc., 
and ,enter into a. .written agreement with such employee .organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. . 
Signed on the 16th day of. January , 19 76 . 
#2C-1/16/76 
Case No. C=1305 
